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INTRODUCTION
In March 2012, “Patents and Public Rights: The Questionable
Constitutionality of Patents before Article I Tribunals After Stern
v. Marshall”1 published in the North Carolina Journal of Law and
Technology. Since the article’s publication, its arguments, or
permutations of its arguments, have been incorporated into various
challenges to the constitutionality of the Article I USPTO’s patent
invalidation power. A number of these challenges remain pending
today.2
This article addresses several common counterarguments raised
in opposition to the constitutional challenges. In this regard, it is
intended as a reply, and argues:
I. McCormick Was Decided on Constitutional Grounds;
II. Litigants and Lower Courts Mischaracterize the Supreme
Court’s Public Rights Rule of Law;
III. The Stakes Couldn’t Be Higher.
I. MCCORMICK WAS DECIDED ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
The Supreme Court’s 1898 McCormick decision features
prominently in the various challenges to the USPTO’s
constitutional authority to invalidate issued patents for intellectual
property.3 Given that McCormick held that the revocation of issued
1

13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 287 (2012).
By way of background, Cooper v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016), and MCM
Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016), were re-listed by
the Court after end-of-summer conference before eventual denial; a brief-inopposition was requested in Cooper v. Square, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 475 (2016),
before denial; in Oil States Energy Services, LLC, v. Greene's Energy Group,
LLC, No. 16-712 (U.S. cert petition filed Nov. 29, 2016), the Court recently
directed the USPTO to submit its otherwise-waived response—cert conference
remains unscheduled; Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc., No. 17517 (Fed. Cir. filed Jan. 13, 2015) and Security People, Inc. v. Lee, No. 162378 (Fed. Cir. filed July 8, 2015), submitted to the Federal Circuit petitions for
hearing en banc—in both instances, the Federal Circuit recently requested
opposition briefs. Importantly, the complete Supreme Court (i.e., nine Justices)
has yet to consider the constitutional question (cert stage).
3
See, e.g., Cooper v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016); Cooper v. Square, Inc., 137
S. Ct. 475 (2016); MCM, 137 S. Ct. 292; Oil States (No. 16-712); Cascades
2
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patents by the Article I Patent Office constitutes “an invasion of
the judicial branch of the government by the executive,”4 its
inclusion is not surprising. What is surprising, however—the
express language of McCormick aside—is that the Federal Circuit
held in its precedential December 2, 2015 MCM decision that
McCormick was decided on statutory (as opposed to constitutional)
grounds.5
In practical terms, this means that the USPTO’s adjudicatory
authority over issued patents is a mere question of statutory
convenience per the executive and legislative branches. Thus,
should the executive and legislative branches determine that issued
patent invalidity is better resolved in a “one-stop shop” Article I
solution, the matter is a question of statutory authorization and
little more.
To be fair, this conclusion is the necessary and correct result
stemming from the Federal Circuit’s holding that patent invalidity
is a “public right.”6 Definitionally, “public rights” are
administrative claims belonging to the executive and legislative
branches of government. Those branches may invite the judiciary’s
participation, but are under no obligation to do so. “Private rights,”
conversely, are claims protected under the Constitution, and
constitute the core of the Article III judicial power.
In this regard, the interpretation of McCormick necessarily
decides the underlying private right versus public right question.
McCormick was decided some forty-two years after Murray’s
Lessee (discussed infra), and any conclusion that a particular claim
Projection (No. 17-1517); Security People (No. 16-2378); In re Depomed, Inc.,
No. 16-1378, 2017 WL 676604 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2017).
4
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman Co., 169 U.S. 606, 612
(1898).
5
MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2015). See also Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent
Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. SCL. & TECH. L.J. (Apr. 3, 2017, v. 5) (forthcoming
2017) (evaluating favorably the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that McCormick
was decided on statutory grounds).
6
See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985), modified on
reh’g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226
(Fed. Cir. 1992); MCM, 812 F.3d 1284.

4
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does or does not have a constitutional guarantee also implicitly
clarifies the underlying private right–public right dichotomy.
Where a private right is guaranteed Article III resolution, where a
public right may be resolved before an Article I administrator, with
optional (per Congress) Article III supervision, a decision
committing resolution of the claim to an Article I or Article III
court clarifies the private right–public right determination.
The interpretation of McCormick is thus very important, and
the Federal Circuit recognized as much in MCM. Nonetheless,
MCM marks the first time since McCormick’s publication in 1898
that a federal court has identified it as ruling on statutory, and not
constitutional, grounds.7 Curiously, the Federal Circuit in MCM
declined to address, or even acknowledge, its own prior conclusion
in Patlex that McCormick was decided on constitutional grounds.
As the Federal Circuit itself identified in MCM, however, Patlex
binds it absent en banc intervention, and thus presumably
discarded Patlex’s holding regarding McCormick as dictum. Given
that Patlex sought to resolve the potential unconstitutionality of ex
parte reexamination, a determination that Patlex’s review of
McCormick is dictum unworthy of mention in a parallel case
reviewing the potential unconstitutionality of inter partes review is
peculiar.
It is argued that the language of McCormick is, at best,
ambiguous. To the contrary, the language of McCormick is, on its
face, clear, and in any event, the McCormick case was not decided
in a vacuum. Instead, the decision represents the culmination of
nearly three decades’ worth of Supreme Court decisional authority
establishing the constitutional rights inherent to all patent owners,
both in the land and intellectual property contexts. The McCormick
decision is thus replete with citations and pin citations to the
Court’s own authority. It is from these constitutional cases that the
McCormick holding is derived.
7

Consider, for example, recent commentary from Judge Robinson (D. Del.)
noting “the national implications of patent litigation—constitutional rights
reviewed first by a federal agency and ultimately by a national, not regional,
court of appeals . . .” Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. OmniVision Technologies,
Inc., No. 1:16-CV-00290-SLR (D. Del Apr. 22, 2016) (emphasis added).
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Assuming arguendo that the unequivocal language of the
McCormick decision is ambiguous, any interpretation is defined by
the authority from which the McCormick holding is derived. As the
review below will demonstrate, the Supreme Court cases relied
upon in the McCormick decision are unmistakably constitutional,
and thus any conclusion that McCormick was decided statutorily
and not constitutionally is not merely improbable, but impossible.
A. The McCormick Court Evaluates Patent Reissue Procedure
Reissue procedure at the time of the McCormick decision
allowed a patentee to submit his patent for reissue under limited
circumstances. Importantly, it was the patentee who voluntarily
initiated the reissue process. For example, if the patentee discerned
“any error [in, e.g., the specification] which may have been found
to have arisen from his inadvertence or mistake,” then that patentee
could pursue a “reissue” of the original patent correcting the
identified problems.8 A patent examiner then reviewed the reissue
application and could cancel claims from the original patent (but
not in the original patent) as a precondition to “reissuing” the
amended patent.
Pursuant to this procedure, once initiated, the patentee
submitted his patent to the Patent Office, which then retained
physical custody over the patent. Once the “new” patent was ready
for reissue, the patentee then voluntarily “surrendered” the original
patent back to the Patent Office. The “new” patent reissued with its
errors corrected.
The question certified for the Supreme Court by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, was what legal effect, if
any, the patentee’s refusal to surrender the original patent at the
conclusion of the reissue process had where the patent examiner
identified a number of claims in the original patent as
unpatentable. Stated differently, but for the voluntary surrender of
the patent by the patentee, could the Patent Office cancel claims
from an issued patent for intellectual property during the reissue
process?

8

McCormick, 169 U.S. at 610.

6
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B. The Express Language of the McCormick Decision
The short answer from the Supreme Court was an emphatic
“no.”9 For an opinion purportedly addressing the statutory
authority granted to the Patent Office by Congress, it is peculiar
that the statute is hardly mentioned at all. Interestingly, where the
statute is discussed, it is for the purpose of identifying the intent of
the patentee in submitting the application for reissue.10
Specifically, per the Court “[t]he object of a patentee applying for
a reissue is not to reopen the question of the validity of the original
patent, but to rectify any error [arising from inadvertence or
mistake].”11 This suggests a potential endorsement of consent
doctrine—that is, but for voluntary surrender of the patent by the
patentee to the Patent Office, the Patent Office lacks constitutional
authority to reconsider questions of invalidity.12
The language of the statute thus hardly factors in the
McCormick opinion. It is implausible that a decision devoted to
resolving the scope of statutory authority committed to the Patent
Office by Congress would largely decline to address the statute, or
even identify the relevant section(s) conferring invalidation power.
It is further implausible that in a “statutory” decision the Court
would include numerous citations and pin citations to its
constitutional, separation of powers authority. Consider the
following passage from McCormick. By its text alone, the opinion
is clear:
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that
when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of
the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents,
and has affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has
passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office,
and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the
President, or any other office of Government. It has
9

See generally McCormick, 169 U.S. 612.
Id. at 610.
11
Id.
12
And if the act of voluntary surrender is the revocation, no statutory
provision can dictate the intent of the patentee. Under this scenario, the statutory
authorization argument is an illogic.
10
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become the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled
to the same legal protection as other property. The only
authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or
to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts
of the United States, and not in the department which
issued the patent.13
Consider the McCormick passage again, now with its cited and pin
cited authority italicized for emphasis:
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that
when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of
the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents,
and has affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has
passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office,
and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the
President, or any other office of Government. United States
v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378; United States v. Am. Bell
Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363. It has become the
property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same
legal protection as other property. Seymour v. Osborne, 11
Wall. 516; Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, United
States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 271, citing James v.
Cambell, 104 U.S. 356. The only authority competent to set
a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason
whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and
not in the department which issued the patent. Moore v.
Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533; United States v. Am. Bell
Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364; Michigan Land &
Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 589, 593.14
To the extent that the cited decisions were resolved on
constitutional grounds, it necessarily follows that McCormick was
resolved on constitutional grounds. There is no alternative
interpretation.

13
14

169 U.S. at 608-09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id.

8
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C. Review of McCormick’s Cited Constitutional Authority
In order to demonstrate that McCormick is constitutional
authority, each sentence, and each cited case, from the above
passage is evaluated in turn. The passage begins:
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that
when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of
the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents,
and has affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has
passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office,
and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the
President, or any other office of Government. United States
v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378; United States v. Am. Bell
Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363.15
United States v. Am. Bell16 is a highly important case, perhaps
just as important if not more so than McCormick, and there the
Court sought to determine whether the Government had the
constitutional authority to pursue a bill in equity for the
cancellation of two patents for intellectual property fraudulently
obtained. Although the Court held that the Government had the
constitutional authority (absent statutory authorization, analogizing
to land patents) to pursue relief against the patentee, the Article III
courts nonetheless retained the authority to revoke the patents in
such a suit. Specifically, the Court differentiated between the
“special privileges” issued from the King of England as
prerogatives of the Crown, which could be annulled by order of the
King, and the property rights inherent to all patent owners in the
United States. In the Court’s words:
We have no king in this country; we have here no
prerogative right of the crown; and letters patent, whether
for inventions or for grants of land, issue not from the
President but from the United States. The President has no
prerogative in the matter.17
On page 363 of the Am. Bell opinion, which is pin cited by the
McCormick Court, the Am. Bell Court continues:
15

Id.
128 U.S. 315 (1888).
17
Id. at 362–63 (emphasis added).
16
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The patent, then, is not the exercise of any prerogative or
discretion by the President or by any other officer of the
government, but it is the result of a course of proceeding,
quasi judicial in its character, and is not subject to be
repealed or revoked by the President, the Secretary of
Interior, or the Commissioner of Patents, when once
issued.18
Thus, although the Federal Government retained the
constitutional authority to pursue the invalidation of patents
fraudulently obtained—certainly a noble cause19—the Court made
clear that, in pursuit of that noble cause, the Government’s
recourse could only be found in the Article III courts, and not in
the executive department which issued the patent.
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding.
In United States v. Schurz,20 the Court was asked to consider
whether the General Land Office could withhold delivery of a land
patent once it was signed, sealed, and recorded by that office. In
particular, the General Land Office identified, after patent
recordation, evidence of “conflicting rights of other parties to the
lands covered by it.”21 Although the Land Office controlled most
aspects of the granting process (both ministerial and judicial), the
Court held that, once granted, title to the land passed from the
government, and only a court as a matter of constitutional principle
had the authority to revoke the patent. Therefore, the Land Office
could be compelled by writ to deliver the patent to the patentee
(even where there was newly discovered evidence of “conflicting
rights”). Specifically, the Court explained:
The Constitution of the United States declares that
Congress shall have power to dispose of and make needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory and other
property belonging to the United States. Under this
provision that sale of the public lands was placed by statute
18

Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
Compare, for example, the policy goals underlying the enactment of the
modern post grant review statutes.
20
102 U.S. 378 (1880).
21
Id. at 395.
19

10
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under the control of the Secretary of Interior. To aid him in
the performance of this duty, a bureau was created, at the
head of which is the Commissioner of the General LandOffice . . .
. . . This court has with a strong hand upheld the doctrine
that so long as legal title to these lands remained in the
United States, and the proceedings for acquiring it were yet
in fieri, the courts would not interfere to control the
exercise of the power thus vested in that tribunal. To that
doctrine we still adhere.
But we have also held that when, by the action of these
officers and of the President of the United States, in issuing
a patent to a citizen, the title to the lands has passed from
the government, the question as to real ownership is open in
the proper courts to all the considerations appropriate to
the case. And this is so, whether the suit is by the United
States to set aside the patent and recover back the title . . .
or by an individual.22
The Court further held that it was required to curtail the power of
“a high officer of the executive branch” in order to avoid an
“irremediable injustice.” In the Court’s words:
It is not always that the ill consequences of a principle
should control a court in deciding what the established law
on a particular subject is, and in the delicate matter of
controlling the action of a high officer of the executive
branch of government, it would certainly not alone be
sufficient to justify judicial interposition. But it may tend to
reconcile us to such action as we feel forced to take, under
settled doctrines of the courts, to see that any other course
would lead to irremediable injustice.23
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding.
The next sentence from McCormick, as well as the
constitutional authority from which it is derived, is evaluated.

22
23

Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
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It has become the property of the patentee, and as such is
entitled to the same legal protection as other property.
Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516; Cammeyer v. Newton,
94 U.S. 225, United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 271.24
In United States v. Palmer, the owner of a patent for
intellectual property claiming improvements in infantry equipment
sued the Government for breach of implied license. In essence, the
Government used the patented improvements and declined to pay
the patent owner in contravention of an implied agreement
between the parties.
The Government objected to the lawsuit on jurisdictional
grounds. The Court held that the Court of Claims (as opposed to
the Circuit Court) had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute given that
the alleged breach of implied license was a contract action, and not
a tort. If either patent infringement or invalidity were at issue, then
the Circuit Court would have exclusive jurisdiction.
Interestingly, and perhaps troubled by the facts of the case, the
Court did not stop there—although it could have relative to the
jurisdictional arguments presented. Specifically, the Court
confronted the antiquated English practice reserving to the Crown
the right to use patented inventions:
It was at one time somewhat doubted whether the
government might not be entitled to the use and benefit of
every patented invention, by analogy to the English law
which reserves this right to the crown. But that notion no
longer exists.25
On page 271 of the Palmer opinion, which is pin cited by
McCormick, the Court continued:
The United States has no such prerogative as that which is
claimed by the sovereigns of England, by which it can
reserve to itself, either expressly or by implication, a
superior dominion and use in that which it grants by letterspatent to those who entitle themselves to such grants. The
government of the United States, as well as the citizen, is
24
25

169 U.S. at 609.
128 U.S. at 270.

12
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subject to the Constitution; and when it grants a patent the
grantee is entitled to it as a matter of right, and does not
receive it, as was originally supposed to be the case in
England, as a matter of grace and favor.26
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding.
In Seymour v. Osborne¸27 the Court held that in a dispute
between parties for alleged patent infringement, reissued patents
may be invalid where they claim an invention substantially
different from what was originally claimed. In the Court’s view,
any reissued patent granted by the Commissioner failing to comply
with the Patent Office’s guidelines was invalid for want of
statutory authority.
Nonetheless, the Court held that only a court of equity could
make determinations regarding reissued patent invalidity:
Inventions secured by letters patent are property in the
holder of the patent, and as such are as much entitled to
protection as any other property . . . 28
. . . Whether a reissued patent is for the same invention as
that embodied in the original patent or for a different one is
a question for the court in an equity suit to be determined
as a matter of construction, on a comparison of the two
instruments, aided or not by the testimony of expert
witnesses, as it may or may not appear that one or both may
contain technical terms or terms of art requiring such
assistance in ascertaining the true meaning of the language
employed.29
Perhaps not as overt as the other cited authority, this, like
McCormick, is nonetheless a constitutional holding.

26

Quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882) (emphasis added).
James v. Campbell was recently discussed, and favorably applied, in a Supreme
Court majority opinion. See Horne v. Dept. Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427
(2015).
27
78 U.S. 516 (1871).
28
Id. at 533.
29
Id. at 545–46 (emphasis added).
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In Cammeyer v. Newton,30 a patent owner sued an employee of
the Government for patent infringement. The Court found that
patent infringement had not occurred, but, like the Palmer Court,
took the decision a step further. Specifically, in the first paragraph
of the opinion, the Court explained:
Holders of valid letters-patent enjoy, by virtue of the same,
the exclusive right and liberty of making and using the
invention therein secured, and of vending the same to
others to be used, as provided by the act of Congress; and
the rule of law is well settled, that an invention so secured
is property in the holder of the patent, and that as such the
right of the holder is as much entitled to protection as any
other property . . . 31
The Court continued, perhaps troubled by the alleged infringement
of privately-owned patents by members of the Government:
Public employment is no defense to the employee for
having converted the private property of another to the
public use without his consent and without just
compensation. Private property, the Constitution provides,
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation;
and it is clear that that provision is as applicable to the
government as to individuals . . .
. . . Agents of the public have no more right to take such
private property than other individuals under that provision
[of the Patent Act], as it contains no exception warranting
any such invasion of the private rights of individuals.32
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding.
The next sentence of McCormick is particularly important, and
this statement has been quoted numerous times by parties
challenging the constitutionality of the USPTO’s patent revocation
power.
30

94 U.S. at 226 (1876).
Id. at 226 (emphasis added). For additional discussion regarding intellectual
property patents as constitutionally-protected private property, see generally
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection
of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007).
32
94 U.S. at 234–35 (emphasis added).
31

14
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The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to
annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested
in the courts of the United States, and not in the department
which issued the patent. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530,
533, United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S.
315, 364; Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S.
589, 593.
Moore v. Robbins33 is another highly important case, and
perhaps belongs in the same pantheon as McCormick and Am. Bell.
In Moore, a land patent was issued by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to “Party A.” “Party B” appealed from the
decision of the Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior,
arguing that it (as opposed to Party A) was the rightful owner and
thus entitled to the patent. The Secretary agreed, and directed the
return of Party A’s patent to the Land Office. Party A refused, and
litigation ensued.
Significantly, the lower court agreed with Party B “on the
ground that to the officers of the Land Department, including the
Secretary of the Interior, the acts of Congress had confided the
determination of this class of cases.”34 Stated differently, the lower
court read the relevant statute as conferring adjudicatory authority
to the Land Office. The Supreme Court’s response is critically
important in terms of undermining the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of McCormick. The Court expressly declined to
evaluate or review the relevant statute:
Without now inquiring into the nature and extent of the
doctrine referred to by the [lower] court . . . it is equally
clear that when the patent has been awarded to one of the
contestants, and has been issued, delivered, and accepted,
all right to control the title or to decide on the right to the
title has passed from the land office. Not only has it passed
from the land office, but it has passed from the Executive
Department of the government.35

33

96 U.S. 530 (1878).
Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
35
Id. (emphasis added).
34
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Thus, the Supreme Court declined to evaluate the text of the
statute, or whether the Land Office had been statutorily
empowered to recall the patent. Instead, the Court held as a matter
of constitutional principle that the right to recall title had “passed
from the Executive Department.” This case underlies the
McCormick holding, and the Federal Circuit’s view of it is in direct
conflict.
The McCormick Court pin cited page 533 of the Moore opinion
for the proposition that patents for intellectual property may only
be invalidated by an Article III court. There, the Moore Court
continued in a similar vein:
But in all of this there is no place for the further control of
the Executive Department over the title. The functions of
that department necessarily cease when the title has passed
from the government. And the title does so pass in every
instance where, under the decisions of the officers having
authority in the matter, a conveyance, generally called a
patent, has been signed by the President, and sealed, and
delivered to and accepted by the grantee. It is a matter of
course that, after this is done, neither the secretary nor any
other executive officer can entertain an appeal. He is
absolutely without authority. If this were not so, the titles
derived from the United States, instead of being the safe
and assured evidence of ownership which they are
generally supposed to be, would be always subject to the
fluctuating, and in many cases unreliable, action of the
land office. No man could buy the grantee with safety,
because he could only convey subject to the right of the
officers of the government to annul his title.
If such a power exists, when does it cease? There is no
statute of limitations against the government; and if this
right to reconsider and annul a patent after it has once
become perfect exists in the Executive Department, it can
be exercised at any time, however remote. It is needless to
pursue the subject further. The existence of any such power
in the Land Department is utterly inconsistent with the
universal principle on which the right of private property is

16
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founded . . . [Party A] has a title perfect both at law and in
equity. (emphasis added).36
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding. And not only is
it a constitutional holding, it is a constitutional holding made in the
face of a question of statutory interpretation—a question of
statutory interpretation the Court expressly declined to resolve in
favor of addressing the overriding constitutional principles.
United States v. Am. Bell is cited again by the McCormick
Court, this time, however, pin citing page 364 as opposed to page
363. Recall that the Am. Bell Court approved the Federal
Government’s ability to unilaterally pursue the revocation of
intellectual property patents obtained by fraud. The same Court
was also careful to ensure that, although the Federal Government
had the power to initiate revocation proceedings, those proceedings
were required to take place in an Article III court. Specifically, the
Court held on page 364 of American Bell that:
The only authority competent to set a patent [for
intellectual property] aside, or to annul it, or to correct it,
for any reason whatever, is vested in the judicial
department of government, and this can be effected by
proper proceedings taken in the courts of the United
States.37
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding.
In Michigan Land v. Rust,38 the Supreme Court held that prior
to the grant of a land patent, the General Land Office retained
significant authority to review the validity of rights claimed against
the Government. This case arose in the context of a dispute
regarding the designation of property as swamp land. Per the
statute, swamp land was to issue to the state; other land could be
sold to private owners. The disputed land patent had originally
been designated as swamp land; however, the General Land Office
updated its designation before land patent issuance. The Court held
that, prior to patent issuance, the executive department retained
36

Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
128 U.S. at 364.
38
168 U.S. 589 (1897).
37
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significant discretion in the resolution of the right; however, once
issued, only a court could determine patent validity.
The McCormick Court pin cited page 593 of the Michigan
Land decision. There, the Court explained:
[W]henever the granting act specifically provides for the
issue of a patent, then the rule is that the legal title remains
in the Government until the issue of the patent; and while
so remaining the grant is in process of administration, and
the jurisdiction of the land department is not lost . . . In
other words, the power of the department to inquire into the
extent and validity of the rights claimed against the
Government does not cease until the legal title has passed
. . . After the issue of the patent the matter becomes subject
to inquiry only in the courts and by judicial proceedings
(emphasis added).39
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding.
The McCormick decision further rests on other formative
separation of powers cases. Cases like United States v. Stone,40
Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell,41 or Noble v. Union River
Logging Railroad42 do not compel a different result. Suffice it to
say that the Supreme Court in McCormick backed its opinion with
virtually every landmark separation of powers case it had at its
disposal.
To agree that McCormick is statutorily-based requires the sort
of suspension of disbelief better reserved for creative writing. The
case law underlying the McCormick decision is unmistakably
constitutional. In this regard, McCormick is not an esoteric and
long-forgotten manifestation of aberrant Supreme Court decisional
law, but instead the end result of decades of proactive separation of
powers jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, securing for both land
and intellectual property patent owners their day in an Article III
court.
39

168 U.S. at 533 (citing Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530 (1878)).
69 U.S. 525 (1865).
41
135 U.S. 286 (1890).
42
147 U.S. 165 (1893).
40
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In Patlex, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the constitutional
holding of McCormick, and attempted to outmaneuver it with a
mischaracterization of the Supreme Court’s public rights rule. In
MCM, the Federal Circuit confronted McCormick, and reclassified
it as a case of mere statutory interpretation.43 If anything is clear, it
is that the Federal Circuit views McCormick as obsolete. This
imperative, however, lies with the Supreme Court of the United
States, not with the Federal Circuit.
Further, calling into question the constitutional basis of the
McCormick decision necessarily calls into question the
constitutional basis of the many decisions upon which McCormick
relies. This not only creates an improbable (impossible?) result, but
also a dangerous one—if McCormick is a question of mere
statutory authorization, is Palmer the same? What about Am. Bell,
Moore v. Robbins, or James v. Campbell? These cases represent
pillars on the separation of powers landscape, and the Federal
Circuit’s precedential MCM decision directly challenges them.
D. A Historical Review of Interference Proceedings Does Not
Compel a Different Result
It is argued that the Patent Act of 183644 conferred upon the
Commissioner of Patents the power to invalidate issued patents for
intellectual property during interference proceedings. It is true that
§ 8 of that Act empowered the Commissioner to conduct
interference proceedings where “an application shall be made for a
patent which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere
with any other patent for which an application may be pending, or
with any unexpired patent,” and that § 8 of that Act further
empowered the Commissioner to render a decision “on the
question of priority of right or invention.”45 It is not true, however,
that this provision conferred upon the Patent Office the patent
invalidation power.

43

Perhaps an alternative argument, from the Federal Circuit’s perspective, is
that McCormick was wrongly decided.
44
Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
45
Id. § 8.
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Specifically, where § 8 of the Act establishes the administrative
review mechanism, § 16 of the same Act specifies the enforcement
procedure governing the § 8 administrative determination:46
And it be further enacted, That whenever there shall be two
interfering patents, or whenever a patent on application
shall have been refused on an adverse decision of a board
of examiners . . . any person interested in any such patent
. . . may have remedy by bill in equity; and the court having
cognizance thereof . . . may adjudge and declare the either
the patents void in whole or in part, or inoperative or
invalid . . . (emphasis added).47
Per the statute, the patent invalidation power remained in the
Article III courts, and any reliance upon the 1836 Act for the
proposition that administrative patent invalidation was a mainstay
of the United States patent system is misplaced.
As patent academic Professor Mark Lemley48 identified in his
detailed review of the history of patent disputes in the United
States and England, the effect of interference proceedings under
the 1836 Act was two-fold:
The 1836 Patent Act did not include a specific private
cause of action for scire facias cancellation for fraud or
equitable conduct, but only in the case of what we would
today call an interference proceeding between competing
inventors. As a result, revocation proceedings that would
actually declare a patent invalid and therefore void all but
disappeared from U.S. law after 1836.49
And more importantly, from the standpoint of Article III:
46

In this regard, the procedure was (presciently) in harmony with Crowell and
Schor, discussed infra.
47
Patent Act of 1836 § 16.
48
Lemley, Why do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid? 99 VA. L. REV. 1673
(2013). In this article, Professor Lemley provides a comprehensive review of the
history of the American and English patent systems. The purpose of the review
is to support the conclusion that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
does not accompany a “pure” claim of patent invalidity. Although his article
addresses the Seventh Amendment, the historical review is equally applicable in
other contexts—e.g., Article III.
49
Id. at 1699 (emphasis added).
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A closer analogy to the revocation proceeding was the sole
provision in the 1836 Act for private scire facias, which
was available only in the case of disagreement between two
patentees over which one was the true inventor . . .
Notably, the Supreme Court held that a proceeding of this
sort was a proceeding in equity, not law . . . [and] ‘the
nature of the chancery jurisdiction and its mode of
proceeding have established it as the appropriate tribunal
for the annulling of a grant or patent from the
government.’50
Thus, not only did revocation proceedings “all but disappear[]”
after enactment of the statute, the limited revocation proceedings
that did occur (regarding issued patents) took place in Article III
courts.
The Federal Circuit correctly identified in MCM the first
instance of the USPTO receiving the patent invalidation power
from Congress:51
McCormick [] did not address Article III and certainly did
not forbid Congress from granting the PTO the authority to
correct or cancel an issued patent. Congress has since done
so by creating the ex parte reexamination proceeding in
1980; the inter partes reexamination proceeding in 1990;
and inter partes review, post-grant review, and Covered
Business Method patent review in 2011.52
It appears that the USPTO’s interference proceedings were
first empowered to invalidate issued patents by a November 8,
1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (pre-AIA).53 This date is
generally aligned with the enactment of the reexamination statute
(1980), and pre-dates the Federal Circuit’s Patlex decision by
several months.

50

Id. at 1700 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Beyond the question of the Patent Office’s constitutional adjudicatory
authority certified for the Supreme Court in McCormick.
52
912 F.3d at 1289 (emphasis added).
53
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 135 (Pre-AIA): Interferences, BITLAW (Nov. 2015),
http://www.bitlaw.com/source/35usc/135_(pre%E2%80%91AIA).html.
51
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It is further argued that two 19th century Supreme Court cases
support the conclusion that the Supreme Court contemplated the
Article I Patent Office’s patent invalidation power without
objection (constitutional or otherwise), thus confirming that
McCormick was decided on statutory grounds. In particular, the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Duell54 post-dates the
McCormick decision by ten months, and thus, the reasoning goes,
if McCormick was decided on constitutional grounds, it certainly
would have featured in Duell, which did not cite or otherwise
discuss McCormick.
At issue in Duell was whether a patent would issue (pending
resolution of the interference) from competing applications.55 The
broader question was whether Congress could assign Article III
review over pre-grant determinations made by the Patent Office.56
Specifically, the Petitioner argued that the statute conferring
Article III review over the executive determination was an
unconstitutional usurpation of the executive’s power.
Citing Murray’s Lessee, the Supreme Court disagreed.57 Given
that the pre-grant phase of patent issuance implicates “public
rights,” “Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of
the courts [such rights] . . . as it deems proper.”58 Therefore, the
statute providing for Article III review of the Commissioner’s
determination of priority between competing patent applications
did not threaten the separation of powers. Article III review was
completely discretionary per Congress.59
Duell did not feature the invalidation of an issued patent by the
Commissioner, nor did it include evidence that the Court was

54

172 U.S. 576 (1899).
Id. at 583, 586–87.
56
Id. at 582.
57
Id. at 582–83.
58
Id. at 583.
59
In light of the Federal Circuit’s Patlex, Joy, and MCM decisions, the same
reasoning necessarily applies to issued patents. See also Greenspoon, Paternal
Justice: A Bill Cosby Approach to Patents by the PTO, IP WATCHDOG (July 12,
2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/12/paternal-justice-bill-cosbyapproach-to-patents-by-the-pto/id=59620/.
55
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aware that the Commissioner had such alleged power.60 The fact
that the Court reviewed the Patent Office’s ability to deny
applications (whether during interference proceedings or
otherwise) without objection is in harmony with the constitutional
holding of McCormick, in addition to the various constitutional
decisions from which it is derived. The pre-grant phase of both
land and intellectual property patents is both ministerial and
judicial, and implicates “public rights.” Once granted, however,
title passes from the government, the patent vests as private
property, and its validity becomes a matter of “private rights”
requiring Article III resolution. Duell does not deviate from this
constitutional scheme.
Similarly, Morgan v. Daniels61 did not address (or even
acknowledge) the Article I invalidation of an issued patent by the
Commissioner during an interference proceeding. Instead, at issue
in Morgan were competing patent applications.62 The Court held
that the Commissioner’s factual determinations resolving the
question of priority between the competing applications were
treated as controlling (unless contrary testimony was rendered) in
subsequent litigation.63 Morgan, thus, like Duell, is in sync with
McCormick’s constitutional holding.
Finally, to the extent the USPTO revoked issued patents during
interference proceedings, no evidence has been presented that the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of such
proceedings, or that it was even aware that the Patent Office had
such alleged power. The power of the Patent Office to decline
patent applications has never been in dispute—and in this vein,
Duell and Morgan produce unremarkable results.
Absent authority demonstrating that the Supreme Court
expressly contemplated the constitutionality of interference
proceedings revoking issued patents—or, conversely, that the
Supreme Court resolved a case featuring an issued patent
invalidated by the Commissioner during an interference without
60

See generally id.
153 U.S. 120 (1894).
62
See generally id.
63
Id. at 125.
61
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constitutional complaint—reference to interference proceedings
does not call into question the constitutional holding of
McCormick.
II. LITIGANTS AND LOWER COURTS MISCHARACTERIZE THE
SUPREME COURT’S PUBLIC RIGHTS RULE OF LAW
It is argued that even if McCormick was decided on
constitutional grounds, no court should apply it as it is in conflict
with modern administrative law. It is further argued, somewhat
conveniently, that the Court’s public rights rule of law is an
unknowable morass, devoid of identifiable parts. To be sure, the
Court’s public rights precedent is hardly a model of clarity.
However, where the Court’s opinions tend to get “bogged down” is
not in the initial private right versus public right determination
(particularly where a claim has centuries of historical antecedent at
law or equity), but in defining the scope of permissible Article I
involvement once the private right–public right question has been
resolved. Matters are further complicated by the fact that the Court
appears to have a somewhat different approach depending upon
whether an administrative tribunal (e.g., the PTAB) or a legislative
court (e.g., the bankruptcy court) is at issue.
In order to understand the private right versus public right
determination, it is necessary to understand the Supreme Court
case that created it—i.e., Murray’s Lessee.64 Stunningly, in its first
two decisions determining whether the validity of an issued patent
is a matter of private or public rights, the Federal Circuit in Patlex
and Joy neither acknowledged the controlling standard of Murray,
nor even cited to it. No Supreme Court public rights majority,
concurring, or plurality decision has criticized, diminished, or
otherwise declined to apply Murray to the initial private right
versus public right determination. Even the dissent in Stern v.
Marshall applied the Murray rule without objection.65 The “fight”
64

Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272
(1856).
65
Stern, 564 U.S. at 507–08 (J. Breyer observing, in dissent, that “[t]he
majority reads the first part of the statement’s first sentence [of Murray] as
authoritatively defining the boundaries of Article III” (emphasis in original)).
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isn’t over whether Murray should or should not apply, the fight is
over how important the private right–public right designation
should be. And, per the Stern majority, that designation remains
very important.66 In this regard, the Federal Circuit’s Patlex and
Joy opinions stand uniquely alone.
At least in MCM, the Federal Circuit acknowledged Murray.67
However, the Federal Circuit again declined to apply, or even
recite, the Murray standard. As the review below will demonstrate,
the reason for this is clear—applying Murray (like McCormick)
compels a finding of unconstitutionality.
A. The Public Rights Exception: Murray’s Lessee
The definitional complexity of the Supreme Court’s public
rights jurisprudence is well known. The fundamental rationale of
Murray, however, is relatively straightforward: how and where the
nation, newly freed from English oppression, determined to resolve
its disputes constitutes the core of the Article III judicial power.68 If
the nation, during the pendency and eventual ratification of the
U.S. Constitution, provided for the resolution of disputes between
private citizens in a court of law, equity, or admiralty, then the
issue is a matter of “private rights” requiring Article III
resolution.69 Conversely, if the claims (1) were administratively
resolved during this period, or (2) constitute novel statutory causes
of action70 post-dating the ratification of the Constitution, then they
are “public rights,” and may be resolved conclusively by an Article
I tribunal.
Statutory causes of action or affirmative defenses derived from
power conferred by the U.S. Constitution may nonetheless be
private rights, depending upon where these matters were
resolved.71 Importantly, the public rights question compares how
66

Id. at 465.
812 F.3d at 1289.
68
59 U.S. at 281–82.
69
Somewhat perplexingly, litigants argue that this principle only applies to
determinations at law, to the exclusion of equity or admiralty (perhaps
conflating Seventh Amendment review with the public rights analysis).
70
Such “seemingly” private rights are nonetheless public rights.
71
59 U.S. at 280–85.
67
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the colonies resolved their disputes (under English supervision)
with how the newly formed nation determined the same. Where, as
in the case of patent invalidity, there was a shift from legislative
adjudication (colonies) to resolution at law or equity (nation), the
right is necessarily private—the rationale being that the newly
formed nation preferred (as the result of negative experiences) to
have the dispute resolved in a court free from the influence of the
executive.72 The public rights exception also looks to English
practice, but not to the exclusion of the historical American
practice.73 To the extent that the two practices are in harmony, the
private right designation is further supported.74
The facts of Murray demonstrate how this works in practice. In
Murray, a tax collector failed to return the full sum due to the
Treasury; the Solicitor of the Treasury, pursuant to his statutory
authority, then issued a distress warrant against the collector,
compelling the sale of various assets in satisfaction of the
outstanding balance due.75 This process unfolded administratively.
It was argued that this administrative process was a deprivation
of due process, in addition to an unconstitutional exercise of the
Article III judicial power.76 In resolving the question regarding the
judicial power, the Court conceded that the process of auditing the
collector was a “judicial act.”77 But was it a judicial act requiring
an Article III court? The Court said no.78 Although it was a process
susceptible to Article III resolution, it was not required because:
[T]he means provided by the act of 1820 [for collection] do
not differ in principle from those employed in England
from remote antiquity—and in many of the States, so far as

72

Id.
Id.
74
Consider, for example, that the last reported use of the English Privy
Council to invalidate an intellectual property patent was in 1779. Lemley, supra
note 48, at 1684. By this stage, virtually all English patent invalidity disputes
were resolved in the courts of law or equity. Id. at 1683–84.
75
59 U.S. at 274–75.
76
Id. at 275.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 280.
73

26

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 1

we know without objection—for this purpose, at the time
the Constitution was formed.79
That is, in both the United States and England, the matter was
resolved administratively without objection, and therefore
Congress retained discretion as to whether to invite the judiciary’s
participation. This is the public rights rule, and this is how it is
applied. The Supreme Court articulated it in the following (now
famous) form:
[W]e think it proper to state that we do not consider
congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty . . . At the same
time there are matters, involving public rights which may
be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable
of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as
it may deem proper.80
As indicated, the phrase “any matter which, from its nature, is
the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty”
did not appear in the three Federal Circuit opinions holding that
the validity of an issued patent for intellectual property is a matter
of public rights.81 Additionally, the Federal Circuit did not evaluate
where the new nation resolved its patent disputes, or compare

79

Id. at 281–82 (emphasis added). The due process analysis required a similar
review, comparing English practice with U.S. practice after independence had
been achieved: “[W]e must look to those settled usages and modes of
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the
emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to
their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the
settlement of this country.” Murray, 59 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added).
80
Id. at 284. Restrictive permutations of this standard, e.g., Federal
Government as a party, have not survived the test of time. In this regard, the
Court cautioned against doctrinaire reliance upon formal categories, but not to
the exclusion of the law, equity, or admiralty rule. See, e.g., Crowell, 285 U.S. at
53.
81
As discussed infra, a permutation of this standard appears in Judge Nies’
Lockwood dissent.
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where the colonies were required to do the same.82 Similarly, there
is no mention of customary English practice regarding patent
disputes at or around the time of the Constitution’s ratification. As
mentioned, no decision of the Supreme Court has omitted this rule,
including the 2011 Stern v. Marshall majority and dissent.83
Fortunately, this historical review was completed by the
Federal Circuit in a separate context. The question of whether there
is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on a “pure” question
of patent invalidity requires a historical analysis to determine, in
large part, whether a writ of scire facias for patent invalidity (as
opposed to fraud) was resolved at law or equity. This is a complex
question, and it is not addressed here.84 What is important from the
standpoint of Article III is that the writ (and patent invalidity
generally, even as an affirmative defense) was at one or the
other—that is, whether at law or equity, the Article III result is
necessarily the same. Suits at law, equity, or admiralty are private
rights per Murray.85
B. The Historical Narrative: Federal Circuit Case Law
In In re Lockwood, the Federal Circuit determined that a “pure”
question of patent invalidity had a Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial.86 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Petitioner
withdrew its jury trial demand, and Lockwood was vacated.87
82

The determination does not turn on whether the matter is statutorily based.
If this were the case, the statutory right at issue in Murray would have produced
a one sentence opinion (with respect to Article III). Instead, the analysis
determines where the statutory right was adjudicated.
83
See generally 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
84
Compare, e.g., In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995) with Lemley,
supra note 48.
85
Perhaps stated differently, because the Federal Circuit declined to perform
the historical analysis required by Murray and Stern in Patlex, Joy, and MCM,
the historical analysis completed by the same Court in a separate context
(Seventh Amendment) is thus “borrowed”—historical facts are historical facts,
and may be applied in parallel contexts (i.e., Seventh Amendment and Article
III).
86
50 F.3d 966, 976 (1995).
87
See, e.g., Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
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Follow-on decisions by the Federal Circuit have cited Lockwood
favorably.88 Nonetheless, Lockwood is not important for the legal
conclusion that it draws regarding the Seventh Amendment, but for
the history that it tells. And whether vacated or not, historical facts
remain historical facts.
In determining that a pure question of patent validity had a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial,89 the Federal Circuit
looked beyond the Declaratory Judgment Act itself, and instead
reviewed the adjudication of patent invalidity generally.90 Because
patent invalidity was often raised as an affirmative defense to
patent infringement, the Federal Circuit applied the inversion
method—that is, “[i]f the declaratory judgment action does not fit
into one of the existing equitable patterns but is essentially an
inverted lawsuit—an action brought by one who would have been
a defendant at common law—then the parties have a right to a
jury.”91 Thus, the satisfactory “analog” was a suit for patent
infringement (at law) where the affirmative defense of invalidity
had been pled.92 By this rationale, the Federal Circuit concluded
that a jury trial right attached.93
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit also addressed the writ of
scire facias.94 The Federal Circuit reasoned that because the writ
was primarily used to invalidate patents obtained by fraud, it was
more analogous to a claim of inequitable conduct than patent
invalidity. And even if the writ was used to invalidate a patent in a
“pure” sense, the Federal Circuit held that the equity court
exercised both legal and equitable powers, and “[t]hus, in a scire
facias raising genuine issues of material fact, the proceeding in
chancery [i.e., equity] was suspended pending a determination by a

88

See, e.g., In re Tech. Licensing, 423 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Tegal
Corp., 257 F.3d 1331.
89
In Lockwood, the complaint for patent infringement was dismissed; the
declaration of patent invalidity remained in the dispute. 530 F.3d at 968–69.
90
Id. at 973–76.
91
Id. at 975 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92
Id. at 973–76.
93
Id. at 980.
94
Id. at 975.
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jury summoned in the Court of King’s Bench, the main [common]
law court.”95
Applying this analysis to Article III and Murray, patent
invalidity, either as an affirmative defense or as a standalone claim
under a writ, was resolved at law or equity. Therefore, it is
necessarily a private right, and no decision of the Supreme Court
has held to the contrary.
C. Judge Nies’ Lockwood Dissent: Important for What It Says, but
Also for What It Doesn’t
In her dissent, Judge Nies conceded that a jury trial right
necessarily attached to a suit for damages for infringement.96
However, she distinguished the infringement suit scenario,
explaining “[a] separate nullification action, similar to the present
day declaratory judgment action, could be brought before the
English equity court. In England, prior to 1791, anyone could
challenge a patent’s validity by a scire facias writ in equity.”97
Such writs were not merely limited to fraud, which she connected,
like the majority, to inequitable conduct, but also included
“unlawful grant,” i.e. patent invalidity.98 Given that these writs
were resolved at equity, as opposed to law, Judge Nies concluded
that the jury trial right did not attach.99
More importantly, Judge Nies correctly identified that the
majority’s reasoning necessarily triggered a separation of powers
problem under Murray.100 That is, by concluding that patent
invalidity was resolved in American and English courts of law at
or near the time of the Constitution’s ratification, “Patlex must be
overruled under the panel’s reasoning.”101 Per Judge Nies, “[a]

95

Lockwood, 530 F.3d at 975.
Id. at 981.
97
Id. at 984 (emphasis added).
98
Id. at 985.
99
Id. at 981–85.
100
Id. at 983.
101
Lockwood, 530 F.3d at 982.
96
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litigant cannot have a constitutional right and not have a
constitutional right on the same issue.”102
Judge Nies then articulated the Murray standard, as she viewed
it. It is reproduced below exactly as it is written in the dissent:
Congress can [not] withdraw from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law . . . At the same time there are matters,
involving public rights, which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them,
and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but
which congress may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may
deem proper.103
Applying her rendition of Murray, Judge Nies concluded that
because the writ was traditionally resolved at equity, not only was
the Seventh Amendment inapplicable, but the claim also remained
a “public right.”104 Therefore, in Judge Nies’ view, Patlex remained
good law.
The standard reproduced by Judge Nies, however, is not the
Murray rule. Compare with the complete language of Murray, as
written by the Supreme Court:105
Congress can [not] withdraw from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty . . . At the same
time there are matters, involving public rights which may
102

Id. Interestingly, Judge Newman, the author of Patlex, also dissented in In
re Tech. Licensing, where she provided a passionate defense of the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial on “pure” questions of patent invalidity.
Specifically, Judge Newman argued “[p]atent validity was a common law action
tried to a jury in Eighteenth Century England. An action to repeal and cancel a
patent was pled as the common law writ of scire facias . . . [t]his was the
situation in 1791 in England, and the United States Constitution preserved that
[jury trial] right.” 423 F.3d at 1292–94.
103
Id. at 982 (emphasis added).
104
Id. at 981–85.
105
Compare further with, for example, the language of Article III, § 2: “The
Judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in law or equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States . . . ” (emphasis added).
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be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable
of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as
it may deem proper.106
Applying the Supreme Court’s standard to Judge Nies’
conclusion that the invalidity writ was resolved at equity, patent
invalidity is thus a “private right” (without a jury trial right)
requiring Article III resolution. That the Court’s standard was
excised in this fashion is inexplicable. Presumably, Judge Nies
sought to preserve Patlex while simultaneously circumventing the
Seventh Amendment—a result unsupported, however, by the rule
of law.
D. The Historical Narrative: Patent Scholarship
The patent scholarship tells a similar tale. As Professor Lemley
explains:
[M]ost patents in the colonies were grants of government
privilege over land or markets, not patents for invention . . .
I can find no report of colonial patent lawsuits or
revocation proceedings before the American Revolution.
Instead, if a party wanted a legislative patent grant revoked,
they petitioned the legislature to do so.107
After the American Revolution, however, this practice changed,
and the courts became the sole venue for patent invalidation.108 Per
Professor Lemley:
The first federal patent statute was enacted in 1790 . . . The
Act provided that any party could petition a court to cancel
a patent, but only for fraud or what we would describe
today as inequitable conduct . . . Section 6 of the Act
provided that a defendant suing for infringement could
raise a challenge [in court] to the adequacy of the patent
specification . . . 109
106
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Importantly, in the one recorded instance where a party sought
to revoke a patent legislatively, the Congressional committee
declined to do so, and instead referred the invalidity question to the
courts:
[I]n the one reported instance of an effort to revoke a 1790
Act patent, the complainant didn’t go to court at all, in law
or in equity. Instead, following the colonial practice, he
went to Congress, which appointed a committee in 1794 to
consider whether to revoke the patent as improvidently
granted. The committee in turn referred the matter to the
courts for adjudication.110
From there, American patent practice evolved quickly:
[Under the 1793 Act,] the United States operated a
registration system, under which anyone who filed a patent
application was entitled to a patent, the validity of which
was tested (if at all) in the courts. After 1800, federal
subject matter jurisdiction was exclusive; patentees could
no longer sue in state court . . . the 1790 and 1793 Acts
provided federal subject matter jurisdiction only in law, and
not in equity, courts. It wasn’t until 1819 that Congress
enacted federal subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases
in equity.111
The parallel English practice did not diverge meaningfully. By
the time of the U.S. Constitution, Privy Council usage, though
technically still permissible, had fallen into disuse:
The Privy Council was the primary means for revoking
patents until as late as 1753 . . . [but] once the courts had
the power to adjudge patent validity, the Privy Council
largely got out of the business of doing so; it last revoked a
patent in 1779 . . . 112
Instead, the predominant practice was, in relevant part:
The only way to actually invalidate a patent in the modern
sense of the word was to bring a scire facias action for
110
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112
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revocation. And it was the Chancellor, not the jury, who
held the final power to revoke a patent using scire facias.
The fact that scire facias was a common law proceeding
conducted in the first instance of an equity court meant that
the distinction between legal and factual issues was more
important than in the law courts. While chancery courts
could and did refer validity questions to juries at common
law, they did so only when there was a disputed issue of
fact that was necessary to the resolution of the validity
issue.113
Thus, both the American and English systems resolved their
invalidity disputes (whether as affirmative defenses or as
standalone claims) in the courts of law and equity. The colonists,
conversely, received legislative rights that were legislatively
revoked—a practice the new nation assertively abandoned in its
first days.114 And although very early on patent matters could be
resolved in state courts as well as federal courts, by 1800 the
federal courts of law had exclusive jurisdiction.115 This fact, in
conjunction with the predominant English practice by the end of
the 18th Century, demonstrates that the post-issuance patent
invalidation power belongs to the Article III courts.
E. A Brief Review of the Supreme Court’s Public Rights Case Law
In McCormick, the Court held—relying on a bevy of
constitutional separation of powers cases—that an issued patent
may only be set aside by an Article III court.116 Patent invalidity,
whether as an affirmative defense or a standalone writ, has
centuries of historical antecedent both at law and equity.117 Further,
although patent matters were resolved legislatively by the colonies,
the new nation proactively determined to resolve its patent matters
in the courts of law and equity.118 This brings patent invalidity, to
the extent that McCormick didn’t already answer the question, into
113
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the core of the Article III judicial power per Murray (and, more
recently, Stern).
Where the issue becomes complicated is in the resolution of
“what comes next?” That is, if it is a private right, what level of
Article I participation is permissible under the administrative
tribunal and legislative court scenarios? Importantly, whether a
case deals with an administrative tribunal or a legislative court, the
private right versus public right determination is the same.119
Different factors apply, however, once that determination has been
made—and those factors aren’t always clear, or even consistent.120
The USPTO’s courts are administrative tribunals. Where
administrative tribunals adjudicate matters of private rights (i.e.,
issued patent invalidity), Crowell and Schor are the applicable
cases.121 Thus, in order for private right adjudication to be
constitutional in an administrative tribunal setting, that
adjudication must comport with the requirements of both of those
cases.122
In Crowell, the Court was asked to consider whether an
administrative tribunal may adjudicate private right (in this case,
admiralty) claims without violating Article III of the
Constitution.123 The Court held that it could, provided that the
administrative tribunal and the Article III district courts were
correctly aligned.124 Specifically:

119

Compare, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (administrative
tribunal) with Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) (legislative court).
120
Many of these factors have been inappropriately applied to the private right
versus public right question; in most instances, they supplant the Murray
analysis altogether. The result, of course, is a loophole, not a safeguard.
121
For a comprehensive review of the Court’s public rights cases, see
generally Rothwell, supra note 1.
122
Conversely, if patent invalidity is a public right, then there is nothing
constitutionally infirm with the current arrangement (e.g., the PTAB). In fact,
Article III supervision of Article I patent invalidation will continue for only as
long as the executive and legislative branches deem it prudent.
123
See generally Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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Id. at 48–65.
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1) Although the administrative orders were “final,”
enforcement in the event of default required a federal
district court.125
2) Upon commencement of enforcement proceedings, the
district court retained authority to review (a) legal issues
and (b) fundamental (e.g., jurisdictional) facts de novo;
other facts were reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard.126
3) The administrative order was only enforceable by a writ
of execution entered by the district court. But for this writ,
the administrative order had no legal effect.127
Given that the district court retained the enforcement power, in
addition to de novo review authority over questions of law, “[t]here
is thus no attempt to interfere with, but rather provision is made to
facilitate, the exercise by the court of its jurisdiction . . . “128 The
Court cautioned, however:
The recognition of the utility and convenience of
administrative agencies for the investigation and finding of
facts . . . does not require the conclusion that there is no
limitation on their use, and that the Congress could
completely oust the [district] courts of all determinations of
fact by vesting the authority to make them in their own
instrumentalities or in the Executive Department. That
would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the
Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a
bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever
fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do
depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in
effect finality in law.129
Schor130 does not deviate meaningfully from this arrangement.
Specifically, at issue in Schor was a private right common law
125
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claim131 before an Article I administrative tribunal. Because the
administrative orders were only enforceable by a federal district
court, where questions of law were reviewed de novo, and
questions of fact were reviewed for substantial evidence, private
right resolution by the administrative tribunal was not
unconstitutional:
The [administrative] orders, like those of the agency in
Crowell but unlike those of the [legislative] bankruptcy
courts under the [unconstitutional] 1978 Act, are
enforceable only by order of the district court. The
[administrative] orders are also reviewed under the same
‘weight of the evidence’132 standard sustained in Crowell,
rather than the more deferential standard found lacking in
Northern Pipeline. The legal rulings of the [administrative
tribunal], like the legal determinations of the agency in
Crowell, are subject to de novo review.133
In addition to the strict structural requirement defining the
necessary constitutional interrelationship between the federal
district courts and the administrative tribunal, the Schor Court
identified other criteria.134 For example, the consent of the parties,
as well as the Congressional purpose, were important
considerations.135
The introduction of “congressional purpose”136 further serves to
safeguard the separation of powers. A purely structural limitation
(i.e., district court enforcement with de novo–substantial evidence
review) serves as a potential blueprint for the expansion of federal
power. Fact-finding is a critically important element in the
resolution of any dispute, and the substantial evidence standard
confers significant deference to administrative tribunals. Therefore,
131

See id. at 853–54 for Schor’s favorable review (and application) of the
Murray standard.
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Issues of how weight of the evidence might differ from substantial
evidence, or whether de novo review should apply to “fundamental” factual
determinations in light of McCormick, are beyond the scope of this article.
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the Schor factors dissuade the proliferation of administrative
tribunals as a matter of mere structural convenience—that is, if
Congress seeks to delegate the fact-finding function to an adjunct
of the federal district courts, it is required to have a valid
“purpose” for doing so beyond the aggrandizement of federal
power.
Thus, the Schor factors (as the opinion itself indicates) do not
supplant the Murray rule, or otherwise call into question the
structural blueprint established by Crowell. Instead, they introduce
a second layer of review, ensuring that Congress acts for a valid
public purpose when it creates a new (adjunct) administrative
tribunal.
F. Unconstitutionality of Article I Patent Revocation, and How to
Correct
Applying Murray, McCormick, Am. Bell, Moore v. Robbins,
and Stern, the validity of an issued patent for intellectual property
is a private right. If this conclusion is incorrect, then the structural
and policy considerations of Crowell and Schor drop from the
analysis, and, as a public right, Congress is more or less free to do
with it as it pleases. If the private right conclusion is correct, then
the USPTO’s current post-grant patent revocation scheme is
unconstitutional.
In light of the structural principles articulated in Crowell and
Schor, the reasons for this should be clear. Specifically:
1) But for an appeal from the USPTO’s patent revocation
(whether by reexamination, inter partes review, etc.),
the patent is cancelled by the USPTO either in whole or
in part. Federal district court enforcement is not
required.
2) Where a party appeals a determination of patent
invalidity by the USPTO, the Federal Circuit, and not
the federal district courts, entertains the appeal.
The structural fix is straightforward. USPTO patent invalidity
determinations are recalibrated so as to receive federal district
court enforcement, where questions of law are reviewed de novo,
and questions of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence.
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It is argued that Article III appellate review satisfies the
structural limitations identified in Crowell and Schor. No decision
of the Supreme Court has said this, and in this regard Crowell and
Schor speak for themselves. Further, in the context of a legislative
court, both the Northern Pipeline plurality and concurrence137 held
(constituting a majority) that Article III appellate review does not
remedy the constitutional harm where legislative courts adjudicate
private rights.138
If the USPTO’s post-grant revocation proceedings are
recalibrated as adjuncts to the federal district courts, is the
“congressional purpose” aspect of Schor satisfied? The answer to
this question is almost undoubtedly yes. The Supreme Court’s
Cuozzo decision,139 largely devoted to addressing questions of
statutory interpretation, is replete with references to “congressional
objective,” “statutory scheme,” “Congress[ional] purpose,” and the
like.140 It is thus inconceivable that the Court would find this
element of Schor unmet.
III. THE STAKES COULDN’T BE HIGHER
Without question, recalibrating the various USPTO
administrative tribunals as adjuncts to the federal district courts
would represent a seismic shift in the nation’s patent system. The
importance of inter partes review in patent litigation would likely
137

See generally Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 458 U.S 50 (1982).
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The Supreme Court recently evaluated the “basic principles of institutional
capacity,” holding that district court review of administrative determinations of
“multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts . . . are well suited to a district court
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amendable to appellate review. McLane Co., Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 137 S. Ct. 1159
(2017). Compare this with, for example, the factual inquiries typically
conducted during a § 103 obviousness determination: the scope and content of
the prior art; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; the level
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; and objective indicia of
non-obviousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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drop, and patent issues would appear on federal district court
dockets with greater frequency. Third party entities that developed
business models around the PTAB’s lack of standing requirement
would also have to recalibrate. Patent litigation, in terms of its raw
numbers, would likely rebound.
It is untrue, however, that re-designating patent invalidity as a
private right per Murray and Stern would cause large swaths of the
administrative state to fracture. Arguments of this variety amount
to fearmongering, and a decision applying Murray concluding that
patent invalidity was resolved in American and English courts of
law and equity would not cause the administrative state to fracture
any more than Stern caused the administrative state to fracture, any
more than Granfinanciera141 caused the administrative state to
fracture, any more than Schor caused the administrative state to
fracture, and so forth.
This is weighed against the current and potential future harm
caused by leaving the public rights designation unchanged. As the
Supreme Court explained in Stern, public rights are administrative
claims that “[C]ongress may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem
proper,”142 and as Judge Nies explained in her Lockwood dissent,
“Congress could place the issue of [patent] validity entirely in the
hands of an Article I trial court with particular expertise if it chose
to do so.”143
Consider the rapid expansion of the USPTO’s adjudicatory
authority since the Federal Circuit’s March 7, 1985 Patlex
decision. What likely began as a quiet, pragmatic endorsement144 of
the perceived benefits of the newly created ex parte reexamination
mechanism has given way to an administrative tribunal that
adjudicates thousands of patent invalidity disputes (with finality)
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on a per year basis.145 PTAB power grows by the day, and it is not
particularly hyperbolic to say so.
With the public rights designation unchanged after MCM,
Article III supervision over the PTAB remains not a matter of
constitutional right, but instead a question of Congressional
discretion. Given the rise of the PTAB, it is conceivable, per the
“green light” provided by the Federal Circuit, that the executive
and legislative branches will remove patent invalidity from the
Article III courts altogether. Perhaps commentators will scoff at
this notion; but such commentators are not clairvoyant, nor do they
have a crystal ball—they cannot predict the composition of the
next Congress, Senate, or the identity of the next President. What
appears outlandish today might sound rational tomorrow; the
whims of the electorate cannot be predicted.
In footnote 6 of Stern v. Marshall, C.J. Roberts wrote, on
behalf of the majority, “Crowell may well have additional
significance in the context of expert administrative agencies that
oversee particular substantive federal regimes, but we have no
occasion to and do not address those issues today.”146 Those issues
are now before the Court.147 To be sure, the nation stands at a
crossroads.
Basic to the constitutional structure established by the
Framers was their recognition that “[the] accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S at 57 (1982) (plurality), quoting The
Federalist No. 47, p. 300 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison).
145
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